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FUTURE brrmrasTs-Powims OF A.PPoINTMBNT-ExCLusIVB AND NoNBXCLUSIVB PoWERs AND THB DOCTRINE OF h.r.usoRY APPOINTMENTs-Testatrix,
after making certain specific bequests, devised the residue of her estate to her son
George for life. The will stated that upon the death of George, the property
should pass to his widow and descendants, "provided, however, that [George]
may devise his interest to his widow, his descendants or my descendants." The
will further provided that if George should die leaving no widow or descendants,
and without having made a testamentary disposition, the property was to pass
one-half to George's brother and his descendants, and one-half to a sister. George
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died without having married and left a will which disposed of the entire
property to the brother. The sister contended that the testamentary power given
George was nonexclusive, so that the attempted exercise which gave the sister
nothing was void, and the property should pass to the takers in default.1 Held,
the power was exclusive, reversing the lower court. Overruling a line of previous
cases, the court adopted the rule of ·the Restatement of Property that a power is
exclusive unless the contrary is specified by the donor. The court failed to find
such contrary intent. Harlan v. Citizens National Bank of Danville, (Ky. 1952)
251 S.W. (2d) 284.
A special power of appointment may be exclusive or nonexclusive. If exclusive, the donee is not required to appoint to all members of the class, but if nonexclusive, no member of the class may be omitted.2 In deciding whether a
special power is exclusive, the court seeks to determine the intent of the donor.
When this is expressed in unequivocal terms, there is no difficulty, but such is
the exceptional case. More often, courts examine the language used and attach
to certain words or phrases the characterization of exclusive or nonexclusive,
even though these bits of language may be capable of various meanings. Thus,
a power to appoint "to" or "among" the members of a certain group is commonly
held to be a nonexclusive power, even if words of discretion (e.g., "as the donee
shall think best") are added. A power to appoint "to such" or "such oP' the
members as the donee shall elect is typically held exclusive.3 The Kentucky
court had adhered to this type of treatment in a line of decisions,4 but in the past
dissatisfaction had been expressed with the tendency to hold powers nonexclusive
in doubtful cases.5 In the instant case, the court set out to limit the number of
possible nonexclusive powers. It adopted the rule of the Restatement of Prop-

1 More particularly, the sister maintained that, while the donee was free to choose
between ''his widow, his descendants or my descendants," he could not appoint some of the
property to each of these groups, and that within any one of these groups, no member could
be omitted. Since the donee had chosen "my descendants" he could not appoint to the
brother without giving the sister a share.
2 Moore v. Emery, 137 Me. 259 at 274, 18 A. (2d) 781 (1941).
8 Howe, ''Exclusive and Nonexclusive Powers and the illusory Appointment," 42
MICH. L. REv. 649 (1944). The author conducts a detailed study of the meaning put
upon various modes of expression. See also note, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1408 (1935).
4 McGaughey's Admr. v. Henry, 54 Ky. 307 (1854). "To divide ••• as she may think
proper, among her children" held nonexclusive. The court thought the donor's intent was
the same as that expressed in a clearly exclusive power granted as to another part of the
property, but felt bound to :find the power nonexclusive in the absence of an express power
of selection or exclusion. Degman v. Degman, 98 Ky. 717, 34 S.W. 523 (1896) ("among
my children as she may think best" held nonexclusive); Clay v. Smallwood, 100 Ky. 212,
38 S.W. 7 (1896) ("to my other children as she may direct" held nonexclusive); Barrett's
Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 411, 179 S.W. 396 (1915) ("as he may direct ••• to his wife
and heirs at law" held nonexclusive); Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W. (2d) 949
(1928) ("dispose of as she sees proper amongst any of the children" held exclusive). But
see Levi v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co., 121 Ky. 82, 88 S.W. 1083 (1905) ("she
may will or distribute to her relations and to my relations • • • as she may choose or desire"
held exclusive).
Ii Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, supra note 4, at 415.
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erty 6 that a special power is exclusive unless a contrary intent appears, and

decided that the past Kentucky decisions which found nonexclusive powers in
ambiguous language had been wrongly determined. 7 The power in the principal
case was found exclusive under this rule. This decision, it would seem, goes
beyond the intent of the Restatement writers, for this reason: the Restatement
applies a presumption of intent to create an exclusive power where the language
is colorless,8 but it would also acquiesce in reference to ambiguous wording to
determine intent. Thus, the Restatement finds that an interpretation of a power
$'to divide .•• on his death among my children" as nonexclusive is justified.9
In applying the Restatement rule, the Kentucky court decided that a previous
case in that state which held nonexclusive a power "to divide . • • as she may
think proper, ,among her children" was error. 10 While it is difficult to generalize
from a single case, it may be that under the new Kentucky rule a nonexclusive
power cannot be granted except in unmistakable terms.11 It would be interesting
to discover how Kentucky would treat a power "to dispose of the same after his
death among his children in such shares • • • as he shall think • • . proper.''12
This language is not unambiguous, but the Restatement holds that it is indicative
of intent to create a nonexclusive power. The Kentucky court might find it
insufficient to do so. This holding has particular significance for Kentucky,
since it is one of the few states that clearly adopts the doctrine of illusory
appointments. 13 At law, the appointment of a nominal sum to certain members
of the class, while giving the bulk of th~ property to others, was a valid exercise
of a nonexclusive power. However, the English courts of equity held these
nominal appointments illusory. Unless each member of the class received a
substantial (although not necessarily equal) portion of the property, the whole
appointment would be set aside.14 While this doctrine has been abolished in
England by statute,15 and in many of the states by statute or decision,18 it is
unquestionably part of the law of Kentucky. The rule is hard to apply in
practice because there is no clear-cut test of substantiality; courts look to percent6 3 PnoP.BRTY RBsTAT.BM.BNT §360 (1940).
7 Principal case at 287-288.
s Howe, ''Exclusive and Nonexclusive Powers and the illusory Appointment," 42
MicH. L. R.Bv. 649 at 651 (1944).
9 3 PRoP.BRTY R.BsTAT.BM.BNT §360, comment c, illus. 4 (1940).
10 Principal case at 288, referring to McGaughey's Admr. v. Henry, supra note 4.
11 Such unmistakable language might be "to all and every of the objects as the donee
shall appoint, but no object shall be excluded by the donee." See Howe, ''Exclusive and
Nonexclusive Powers and the illusory Appointment," 42 MicH. L. R.Bv. 649 at 650 (1944).
12 3 PROPERTY R:I!STAT.BM.BNT §360, comment c, illus. 3 (1940).
13 Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, supra note 4, at 413. The McGaughey, Degman, and
Clay cases, supra note 4, also announced the rule, but it was dictum therein. Georgia secures
the doctrine by statute, Georgia Code Ann. (1935) §§37-602, 37-604.
14 Howe, ''Exclusive and Nonexclusive Powers and the illusory Appointment," 42
MicH. L. R.Bv. 649 (1944); Moore v. Emery, supra note 2.
15 Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. V, c. 20, §158(1) (1925). Earlier versions had
stated that no appointment should be invalidated because the sum was nominal. The
present text states that no appointment is invalid because it excludes a member of the class.
18 For the division of authority as of 1944, see Howe, ''Exclusive and Nonexclusive
Powers and the illusory Appointment," 42 MICH. L. R.Bv. 649 at 669-671.
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ages rather than absolute amounts, but no distinct line between the nominal and
the substantial exists.17 The present case, in greatly reducing the number of
powers that can be found nonexclusive, proportionately reduces the potential
application of the illusory appointment doctrine. In so far as this decision
preserves nonexclusive powers for a few cases and will continue to protect them
from illusory appointments, it should please those writers who believe that the
device is a useful one. If the donor wishes to secure to each member of the
class a minimum amount, other methods are open to him which create less
difficulty, and are more certain of result, than nonexclusive powers. 18 Therefore
the alternative of abolishing such powers or, what is very nearly the same thing,
discarding the illusory appointment doctrine, seems justified.19

John Houck, S.Ed.

17 Ibid.

The writer has collected all the cases in which the court reported both the

total amount of the property and the size of the gift in question, and concludes that the
line between validity and invalidity lies, in practice, between certain very narrow percentages.
18 The usefulness of a power of appointment lies chiefly in the discretion granted to
the donee. If the donor wishes to insure a minimum appointment to each of the class
members, such should be stated and discretion granted as to the remainder.
19 The better course is to hold all powers exclusive. A court that retains nonexclusive
powers and simply abolishes the illusory appointment doctrine would invalidate an appointment that completely omits a member of the special group, but would uphold an appointment that gives him one cent.

